While Hong Kong protests, Macau is experiencing a political awakening of its own.
If you asked someone to describe the culture of Chinese gambling hub Macau, political awareness would hardly be the first attribute to come to mind. But as Hong Kong’s people defy Beijing and keep hope alive for universal suffrage through protracted protests– which appeared to reignite overnight after talks with Hong Kong authorities failed – China’s other special administrative region is not immune to the allure of democratic concepts coming from across the Pearl River Estuary. As Hong Kong’s influence supplements new homegrown political and labor activism, the stage may be set for Macau’s own grassroots democracy movement.
Macau’s people first showed signs of a political awakening of its own in May 2014, when mass rallies forced the region’s chief executive to forfeit a controversial bill. The measure would have provided extravagant retirement packages for top officials and given the serving Macau chief executive immunity from criminal charges. In response, as many as 20,000 of Macau’s half a million citizens surrounded the territory’s legislature and demanded that the idea be scrapped, forcing Chief Executive Dr. Fernando Chui Sai On to heed their call. Many took time off from work to participate, realizing for the first time that political activism can lead to improved governance. As casino worker Ada Pun explained, before Macau’s people saw their Hong Kong counterparts as troublesome, “But this time, the Macau government is testing our bottom line … and we finally realised we could make a change if we stood united.” Rally organizer Sulu Sou Ka-hou called the abandonment of the unpopular bill a victory, but maintained that, “at the end of the day, the problem today stems from the undemocratic political system we have.”
The political influence of Hong Kong is also apparent. The city’s ongoing political unrest seems to have emboldened many Macau residents to take up the mantle of universal suffrage as well. This June, after Beijing dismissed as “illegal” Hong Kong’s unofficial referendum on democracy, which turned out 800,000 voters, Macau held its own unofficial referendum on the same question. This took place even as Macau’s own leader was “reelected” by the territory’s pro-Beijing election committee in a one-horse race. Of the nearly 9,000 people who cast their ballot, 89 percent cast a vote of no confidence in their chief executive, and 95 percent said they would prefer their leadership to be chosen through direct elections.
As it happens, this period of dissatisfaction with the political system is overlapping with a period of labor empowerment. On October 3, hundreds of dealers from MGM’s flagship casino went on strike to demand better wages and benefits, following a summer trend of large-scale labor demonstrations. A Morgan Stanley report projects continued labor shortages and increased casino employee bargaining power for several years to come, which may mean increased labor activism during this time. All of this coincides with ongoing political turbulence before Hong Kong’s chief executive election in 2017, which is already having a strong impact on Macau’s political consciousness.
This fusion of drivers over an extended period of time may very well create favorable conditions for massive political demonstrations, supported by Macau labor. It is important to remember that in China, workers have supported calls for democracy before. Tiananmen Square in 1989 was a perfect example of labor marching in support of political rights. In Hong Kong’s current protests, as many as 10,000 workers from all labor sectors have shown solidarity with the Occupy Central movement, adding further legitimacy to their political cause. The workers of Macau may eventually feel inspired to do the same as they witness their Hong Kong compatriots turning out by the thousands to support political freedoms.
For now, the people of Macau will likely look on from afar as the political future of Hong Kong plays out. Even so, Beijing and the world should not simply dismiss Macau’s people as apolitical in orientation, as they soon may gamble that the time to try their luck at democracy has arrived.
David Gitter is a research intern at the Project 2049 Institute. This article was originally published in the Diplomat on October 11, 2014.
Posted on Tuesday, October 7, 2014
by Samuel J. Mun
Asia’s Secret Air Power
Image Credit: REUTERS/Pichi Chuang
other democratic country in the world faces a more dangerous threat picture.
Here’s what Taiwan is doing to ensure its air defense and why it matters for
the United States and the region.
When current and former world leaders, including
Bill Clinton, visit Taiwan, they often stay at the Grand Hotel
Taipei, an opulent Chinese architectural landmark perched on top of Yuan
Mountain. With spectacular views of the downtown riverfront and a palm-lined swimming
pool surrounded by lush green jungle, guests at the Grand Hotel could be
forgiven for thinking they had arrived at one of the most peaceful spots in
East Asia. In fact, just under their feet lies a vast underground command
center from which Taiwan’s top leadership would direct their nation’s armed
forces in the event of a war with China. This facility, like many around the
high-tech island, shows that when it comes to the defense of Taiwan, there is much more
than meets the eye.
Known officially as the Tri-Service Hengshan Command Center,
the sprawling tunnel facility stretches through the mountain in a line that
starts near the Grand Hotel and goes down to the giant Ferris wheel in Dazhi. Built
to defend against China’s growing fleet of ballistic missiles, this hardened
nerve center is designed to allow Taiwan’s government (and thousands of
military personnel) to live and work for months, riding out air raids above
while organizing the defense of Taiwan from below.
Linked to a large network of subterranean command posts and
military bases around Taiwan and its outer islands–as well as the U.S. Pacific
Command in Hawaii–the Hengshan Command Center is the ultimate redoubt for
Taiwan’s president. It is so important, in fact, that China’s strategic rocket
force, the Second Artillery, has actually simulated missile attacks on the
bridges that connect it to the Presidential Office.
On the other side of the city, buried inside a wet rocky
outcropping near the campus of National Taiwan University, lies another tunnel
complex, the Air Operations Center. Known affectionately as “Toad Mountain” by
Taiwanese air force officers, this facility oversees one of the most robust air
and missile defense networks on the planet. Fed vast quantities of information
by airborne early-warning aircraft, long-range radars, listening posts, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and satellites, Toad Mountain stands constant watch over all
of Taiwan’s airspace, ready to scramble fighters or assign surface-to-air missiles
to intercept intruders. And, like every other Taiwanese military facility, it
has multiple back-ups. Just in case.
One of those back-ups is located on Taiwan’s east coast inside
Chiashan or “Optimal Mountain”, not far from the mouth of a gorge cut through
pure white marble. Unlike the gorge, however, no tourists are allowed inside this
billion dollar bunker complex. According to first-person accounts, the base is
an entire military city built inside a hollowed-out mountain. Not only does it
have space inside for parking, arming, and repairing over two hundred fighter
aircraft, it also has its own hospital and multiple gas stations serving jet
fuel. With ten blast doors that exit out to multiple runways via a long taxiway
that can itself be used as an emergency runway, it may be toughest airbase ever
Ninety miles down the coastline, Taiwan’s air force, ROCAF, is
further bolstered by the Shihzishan or “Stone Mountain” complex at Chihhang Air
Base. Though somewhat smaller than Chiashan, its labyrinthine tunnels can still
shelter some eighty aircraft. Both of these facilities benefit from their
strategic locations on the far side of the highest mountain range in East Asia.
Missiles fired from the Chinese mainland can’t reach them–they would smash into
the side of the mountains before they got there.
For this reason Taiwan regularly practices dispersing its fighter
jets from vulnerable west coast bases to airfields on the east coast. Units are
also moved between bases to make it difficult to predict where they might be at
any given time, and dummy aircraft are parked on tarmacs and inside shelters to
confuse enemy intelligence.
To further mitigate the threat of a knock-out Chinese missile
strike on its airfields, Taiwan’s air force maintains five emergency highway
strips where it can land, refuel, rearm, and launch fighters in the event that
nearby runways are cratered. In addition, each Taiwanese airbase has large
engineering units attached to it with ample stocks of equipment for rapidly
repairing runways. Clocking in at four hours, Israel’s Self Defense Force used
to have the world speed record in the runway repair game. No longer. Earlier
this year a team of Taiwanese sappers beat that record by an hour.
Facing an existential threat from China and its much larger
military, these are just a few of many examples of how Taiwan’s military is
using quality to offset its quantitative shortcomings. Whether or not Taiwan
can pull it off could hardly be more important for the United States and the
future of the Asia-Pacific region.
Indeed, if the contest of the century is to be waged between
the U.S. and China for primacy in the Pacific, Taiwan will be the center of the
action. Look at any map and it should quickly become apparent why. Taiwan sits at the crossroads between the East
and South China Seas, within torpedo range of the world’s most heavily
trafficked sea lines. Not only critical
for bottling the Chinese navy up inside the first island chain–and thereby
protecting Japan and the Philippines from the threat of naval blockade–Taiwan
also plays a leading role in the air.
With China fielding ballistic missiles for targeting U.S.
aircraft carrier groups in the Western Pacific and Andersen Air Force Base on
Guam, Taiwan’s defenses matter more now than ever. Chinese missiles would have
to go through Taiwan’s airspace on the way to their targets. With the right combination
of high-powered ballistic missile defense radars and interceptors, Taiwan can
serve as a shield to protect deployed American forces during a contingency.
This potential was inadvertently revealed in late2012 when North Korea launched a
long-range rocket into the Philippine Sea. At the time, Taiwan’s new ultra high
frequency (UHF) radar system was able to track the missile and provide the U.S.
and Japanese warships with 120 seconds of extra warning time–an eternity in the
short life of a hypersonic missile flight.
For this reason and many others, China’s communist party leadership in
Beijing continues to see Taiwan as its most worrisome external political and
diplomatic problem. Viewed by Beijing as
the Chinese world’s first liberal democracy, Taiwan’s remarkable political success
story casts China’s oppressive system in an unfavorable comparative light.
To combat what it thinks
is a grave political threat, Beijing’s strategy has been to employ a
combination of coercive and cooperative measures to isolate (and eventually subjugate)
Taiwan. The most prominent aspect of China’s strategy is its missile build-up, which aims to intimidate the voters
in Taiwan and policymakers in the United States.
Yet without the
ability to dominate the air domain, any Chinese attempt to blockade or invade
Taiwan would be disastrous. This may explain
why China’s amphibious fleet has not grown by a single ship since 2007. It makes little sense for any navy to spend
limited resources on ships that could be sunk at the outset of war.
However, the air and missile threat to Taiwan, and by extension the United States,
is very real and growing fast. China’s Second Artillery Force has developed and
tested a ballistic missile warhead for targeting airfield runways with
penetrating cluster munitions. At the same time, China has been able to convince
two successive U.S. administrations (and three French Presidents) to freeze the
sale of new fighters jets to Taiwan, leading to a widening fighter gap in the Taiwan Strait.
Without new F-16 or
Mirage-2000 fighters, Taiwan knows that it may soon find itself overwhelmed in
the air even though its pilots are far better trained than their mainland adversaries.
In an air war quality may be the most important factor, but quantity matters a
lot too. Fortunately, Taiwan’s government appears to be making serious progress
on developing its own indigenous means of undercutting China’s growing missile
and air forces. While Taiwan will be hard pressed to ensure that it always has cross-Strait
air superiority, it can easily deny the same to China. By developing and
fielding a number of world-class capabilities to survive missile strikes and keep
enemy aircraft from freely operating in its airspace, Taiwan may have broken
the code on deterring Chinese aggression.
Ian Easton is a research fellow at the
Project 2049 Institute. This article was originally published in the Diplomat on
September 25, 2014.
The Second Central Work Forum on Xinjiang (East
Turkestan) was held in May of this year, amidst a surge in protest and violent
attacks by some segments of the Uyghur peoplethat have been
publicly labeled as a “religious separatist movement” by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). Prominent Xinjiang scholar James Liebold notes thatthe Party’s
acknowledgement of a need for change in policy is not explicitly stated in the
dialogue of the Work Forum, yet seems to be signified by both the timing of the
meeting and changes in rhetoric.As stated in China Daily, “[the CCP’s] strategy is proven to be correct and must
be continued in the long run.” However, they must also “update [their] policies
to Xinjiang’s current situations.”The First Central
Work Forum was held in 2010 and its purpose had been to chart a five-year plan
for economic prosperity and stability. As a whole, the region has prospered
economically. However, the core of instability lies in the question of who has
– and who has not -- prospered from the region’s growth. Four factors of the
socioeconomic divide between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese in Xinjiang reveal
the deeper causes of unrest in the region.
First is the lack of engagement of Uyghur locals in the CCP’s
creation and implementation of economic policies in their own region. The top-down,
state-led approach to economic development has engaged primarily high-level
government and military officials and even experts from other regions, many of
whom are unfamiliar and disconnected with the local conditions in Xinjiang and
the needs of its people. It is therefore no surprise that Uyghurs are at a
disadvantaged position to benefit from the fruit of these development policies.
As the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) notes, “continuing marginalization
and alienation of Uyghurs from the benefits of economic growth in East
Turkestan and in China, as well as the cycle of security crackdowns, is
ultimately contrary to the interests of stability in the region and appears
only likely to feed resentment of the kind that has led to the unrest of July
Second, the mass in-migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang province
(both state-sponsored and self-initiated) has also had a tremendous impact on
the prospects of economic growth for Uyghur groups. While the Han Chinese
comprised just 6 percent of Xinjiang’s population in
1949, they represented 39
percent of its people by 2010.Originally, migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang was
supported by the state in an effort to increase Beijing’s influence in that
region. Additionally, Beijing wanted a larger Han population to facilitate negotiations with foreign
oil companies and develop Western China as a bridge with Central Asia.
Recently, there has been a greater self-initiated move on the part of Han
Chinese to migrate to Xinjiang for new economic opportunities presented by a
higher rate of urbanization and growth in the region. Often, these migrants do
not have a high level of education and are willing to accept low wages. This
has exacerbated the Uyghurs’ inability to access jobs, even those at the bottom
end of the economic scale.
Third, one of
the most significant factors underlying the growing socioeconomic divide
between Uyghurs and Han Chinese is the disproportionate growth resulting from “leapfrog development,” a term at the forefront
of objectives during the First Central Work Forum on Xinjiang in 2010. As part
of promoting “leapfrog development,” the Chinese government has increasingly
promoted the privatization of state-owned enterprises and opened the economy to
market forces. According to a study by the Population Studies Center
at the University of Michigan, this transition has fostered greater
opportunities for business development and economic growth in Xinjiang;
however, the benefits of that growth have accrued to Han locals and Han
migrants in the region, squeezing Uyghurs increasingly into self-employment.
The only segment of the economy where Uyghurs’ earnings are on a par
with those of the Han Chinese is in the government sector, reflecting the
state’s direct role in promoting “ethnic equality.” In contrast, ethnic inequality
is greatest in those segments of the economy where the state is no longer
playing a major role. Han locals and migrants are more likely to work in both
public and private enterprises than Uyghurs.
Uyghurs have very little representation in the private sector outside of
informal trade. Since the private sector (albeit still small) is the area
where employment prospects are growing most rapidly, it is no wonder that
Uyghurs feel a sense of frustration and disillusionment.
Lastly, the spatial distribution of ethnic groups is
equally divided in Xinjiang. The Han Chinese live predominately in the
urbanized northeast part of the region, the focal point of state investment and
industrial development, as well as the hub of the region’s growing private
sector activity. In contrast, the Uyghurs live primarily in southwest Xinjiang,
a region that is far more rural and agricultural. As a result, the wealth
generated by the “leapfrog development” initiative, primarily by Han-owned
enterprises, is geographically separated from the Uyghurs as well.
development” policy that was previously at the forefront of CCP objectives in
Xinjiang was barely mentioned at the Second Central Work Forum. Economic
development remains an important priority, yet this shift in terminology could
signify Beijing’s recognition that lessening government involvement in the
economy is not conducive to promoting stability in the region. While specific changes in Xinjiang policy
remain to be seen, President Xi Jinping’s call
for “walls made of copper and steel” and “nets spread from the earth to the
sky” to address instability in the region suggest that the reins on a top-down,
state-led approach will only be drawn tighter in the future. And, with this
approach, the stability that the Party wishes for will remain little more than
Over the past two decades, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have developed a “strategic cooperative partnership” reflected through a sharp increase in bilateral trade, security dialogues, and more recently, frequent discussions on China’s potential role in addressing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. However, while the ROK-PRC partnership is at a historic high point, this relationship faces significant obstacles. These limitations in their ties reinforce the paramount importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance in face of a belligerent North Korea and rising China.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s state visit to China in 2013 demonstrated the immense progress made in ROK-PRC relations since the two countries normalized ties in 1992. Today, South Korea’s trade volume with China has grown to exceed its bilateral trade with the United States and Japan combined, and negotiations for a South Korea-China free trade agreement by 2015 were prioritized during the summit between President Park and President Xi. The two leaders also agreed to establish a high-level security dialogue between Seoul and Beijing and issued a joint-statement calling for the denuclearization of North Korea.
South Korea’s interest in building its partnership with China also goes beyond economic ties and China’s apparent leverage in reining in North Korea. Another source of overlap and agreement between Seoul and Beijing is their shared discord with Japan, against whom they share historical animosities related to Japan’s colonial and wartime legacies in the first half of the 20th century. For example, China’s opening of an exhibition (a request made by Park during her 2013 state visit to China) commemorating Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean who assassinated the first Japanese overseer of colonial Korea, showed further ROK-PRC alignment despite U.S. efforts to promote cooperation between Japan and South Korea.
Although political and economic ties between Seoul and Beijing are warm, decision-makers in Seoul must remain cognizant of Beijing’s strategic goals in the region that are inherently antithetical to South Korea’s security interests. In other words, Chinese efforts to alter the regional status quo and undermine the U.S.-led security architecture in Northeast Asia hinder South Korea’s ability to defend itself from North Korea, which remains an existential threat to South Korea.
China’s efforts to stifle South Korea’s cooperation with the United States—South Korea’s sole security guarantor for over 60 years—highlights the limits of the South Korea-China relationship. For example, in response to annual U.S.-ROK joint military drills intended to increase deterrence against North Korea and improve interoperability, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying asserted that “China is opposed to any move that may result in tensions in the region, whether they be joint drills or the threat of conducting nuclear tests.” Furthermore, at a conference this month in Shanghai, Xi Jinping warned against the strengthening of alliances in the region. And while Xi did not mention the United States, it was clear that he was in part referring to U.S. efforts to improve trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.
It is this very mechanism, however, that directly lends to greater deterrence and preparedness against North Korean provocations and bellicosity. U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and ballistic missile defense will be critical in a military contingency on the Korean peninsula. South Korea and China may empathize with each other’s experience under Japanese colonial rule, but South Korea’s security environment demands that it coordinate more closely with the United States and Japan on security issues. Such coordination is salient particularly for scenarios where the United States will launch operations on and around the Korean peninsula from its bases in Japan.
To what extent will South Korea continue to build ties with China? Public opinion polls by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies from March 2014 indicate that “70.4% of South Koreans [state] that Korea should strengthen the alliance with the United States to check China,” and “53.4% agreed that Korea should strengthen the alliance with the United States even at the risk of making China uncomfortable.” The polling data also suggests that warm South Korea-China ties may not necessarily translate into substantial security cooperation, as China’s reluctance to condemn North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 are not too distant memories for South Koreans who sought China’s support in censuring North Korea.
As the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific in response to China's rise, South Korea’s proverbial status as a “shrimp among whales” is increasingly relevant. Despite Seoul’s recent political and economic leanings toward Beijing, divergent regional security interests reveal clear limits in how far South Korea can balance toward China. Conversely, the U.S.-ROK alliance since 1953 has deterred war on the Korean peninsula and evolved into a “global partnership” rooted in shared values and strategic interests. As such, the U.S.-ROK alliance will remain the indispensable element to South Korea’s security and prosperity for the foreseeable future.
The first Cabinet-level visit by
a US official in 14 years: Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou met US Environmental
Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy on Monday, April 14, 2014. Photo: EPA
By Sabrina Tsai
government-to-government, military-to-military, and people-to-people
interactions with the Republic of China (ROC; or Taiwan) have been relatively
quiet due to long-standing policy practice and growing attention being focused
on the People’s Republic of China (PRC; or China). However, as a friend of the
government and people of Taiwan, the US should do a better job at publicizing
its engagement efforts with Taiwan, such as the separate visits made by three
deputy assistant secretaries from the Departments of State and Commerce during
the last week of March and this week’s Cabinet-level visit by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Indeed, Washington should
reconsider its past and current approach of keeping engagements with Taiwan
quiet and low-key. US interlocutors should be open and transparent in their
dealings with Taiwan in order to highlight meetings as routine and normal
interactions. This would contribute to a better understanding of US-Taiwan
relations among the general public as well as the policy community and help
avoid the risk of the security and trade partnership being undermined by the
strengthening of US-China ties.
Why Publicize US-Taiwan Engagement Efforts?
US-Taiwan cooperation is an
important part of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. People-to-people,
government-to-government, and military-to-military exchanges have the power to
shape and color public perceptions not only in the US and Taiwan, but also in
the PRC. Knowledge and perceptions of US-Taiwan engagement have influence over
how policymakers think in Washington, Taipei, and Beijing, and could create
misperceptions if the basic facts of US-Taiwan engagements are unknown due to
the information being under-publicized or not readily available to the general
public. While some may argue that US-Taiwan cooperation should be kept quiet
and under-the-radar due to both Beijing’s sensitivities toward Taiwan and
Washington’s aversion to political pressure from China (such as that
experienced by US administrations when congressional notifications of Taiwan
arms sales are delivered), the near silence that characterizes US-Taiwan
efforts of cooperation has born several negative effects.
First, ROC officials and leaders
are left to wonder about the strength and vitality of the US commitment to
assist Taiwan’s defense needs vis-à-vis China’s growing military strength and
capabilities across the Strait. The reluctance of US leaders to publicly
announce engagements with Taiwan make the impression that the US could waver
from its commitments outlined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and Reagan’s
“Six Assurances” to assist in meeting Taiwan’s defensive capability needs.
Second, the general public as
well as more seasoned observers in both the US and in the region are likely to
have the perception that US ties with Taiwan are negligible in comparison to US
ties with the PRC. The quietness of US-Taiwan cooperation amidst of growing
publicity for US-China engagements create the misperception that the US may
abandon Taiwan in future conflict scenarios across the Taiwan Strait in favor
of closer ties with mainland China. US security commitment to Taiwan under the
TRA should be reaffirmed to public observers by steps to boldly publicize
US-Taiwan efforts of cooperation.
Third, the quietness of US-Taiwan
engagements has a negative effect on US-China relations by creating the
misperception that US support for Taiwan is weak. The importance for Washington
to signal its support for Taiwan to Beijing by publicizing regular engagements
with Taipei cannot be overstated. Increased publicity of regular interactions helps to counter the object of Chinese political warfare aiming to shape public perceptions about US-Taiwan relations favorable to Chinese dispositions. As a vibrant democracy with 23 million people
and an important trade partner, Taiwan matters to the US, a fact that cannot be
undermined as Washington works on closer cooperation with leaders of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The quietness of US-Taiwan interactions gives
Beijing the impression that Washington is willing to compromise its security
partnership with Taiwan, hence emboldening Chinese activities in the region.
With territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea ongoing,
Washington cannot afford to edge China on to more aggressive behavior through
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that would jeopardize regional stability.
Despite concerns of over-publicizing US-Taiwan
engagement, the US should work to be more open and transparent in its dealings
with Taiwan, highlighting regular meetings as normal interactions for two
legitimate governments. Due to the heavy emphasis on US-China engagement
efforts reflected by the media and the policymaking community, scarce public
attention given to US-Taiwan engagement coupled by a low-key disposition of US
policymakers on Taiwan have contributed to little attention being cast on one
of the most important security partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region.
Please note that the opinions expressed by AsiaEye bloggers are theirs alone, and do not reflect the official positions of the Project 2049 Institute.
About the Project 2049 Institute
The Project 2049 Institute seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid-point. The Institute is the only Washington-based think tank that focuses exclusively on future-oriented studies of the Asia Pacific.