How Chinese Analysts Understand Taiwan’s Geostrategic Significance

 (Source: East Asia satellite image via Shutterstock.com)

By David Gitter

The Taiwan problem is not only a problem between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; its overall development trend will also be decided by the East Asian-Western Pacific region’s great power relations, and by the region’s geopolitical situation.

Many seasoned observers of cross-strait relations might be surprised to know that the above quote comes from the study materials of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Party School – but they should not be. In an age where Beijing controls the narrative surrounding Taiwan as solely the domain of China’s internal affairs, it is important to remember that Chinese strategists have soberly assessed the geostrategic significance of Taiwan for hundreds of years, fully cognizant that it sits but 80-some miles off China’s coast and straddles both the East and South China Seas.

The late U.S. scholar Alan M. Wachman reminded the West of this in his influential 2007 book, Why Taiwan?. In that work, Wachman explains that Chinese dynasties viewed Taiwan as a protective barrier against foreign invaders, and as a threat to China’s security once controlled by outside powers. History shows that the danger posed to China from Taiwan was not merely symbolic: Ming loyalists used the island as a springboard for inciting rebellion in Qing China during the seventeenth century, the Japanese military launched operations against China from Taiwan during World War II, and Republic of China (ROC) raids were unleashed from Taiwan against Communist China during the Cold War.

Today, as Chinese projects power into the South China Sea and beyond, People’s Republic of China (PRC) analysts continue to view Taiwan’s U.S.-enabled de facto independence as a threat to the PRC’s national security and an impediment to China’s national greatness. On the contrary, a Taiwan that is united with the Mainland is described as a springboard to project power past the first island chain. Such views are apparent to those who peek just beneath the surface of the PRC’s rhetoric expounding the rationales of national humiliation, national unity, and territorial integrity for subjugating the island.

A common theme found in readily available Chinese writings is that Taiwan is the “key” to the PRC’s regional ambitions. Firstly, Taiwan continues to be described in CCP and scholarly sources as either a shield guarding China’s rich coastal underbelly or a danger to China’s regional security. Prominent Shandong University scholar Ma Fengshu (马风书) wrote in 2014 that Taiwan is the core of China’s most strategically-important area: its eastern geopolitical block. Ma assesses that this block is crucial for China’s economic development and also possesses the highest latent potential for conflict, given the area’s current U.S. domination and the perceived infringements on China’s territorial rights there. In order to deal with the threat of conflict, Ma states that China must overcome U.S. regional manipulation by fully exploiting East Asian states’ economic reliance on China, including Taiwan’s.

Similar ideas are professed by Zhang Wenmu (张文木), a scholar at Beihang University’s Center for Strategic Studies. In January 2016, Zhang asserted that China must adhere to Mao Zedong’s strategy to confront multiple complicated contradictions: first identify and address the main contradiction, and the rest will easily fall into place. Regarding China’s present territorial friction versus the United States, Japan, and ASEAN states, Zhang asserts that the main “contradiction” lies within the Taiwan issue:

Presently the East China Sea and South China Sea give rise to a good deal of hard-to-solve problems; their roots rest under the control of the Taiwan Problem. If China accomplishes the Taiwan Strait’s unification, the area between Taiwan Island and Hainan Island can form an expansive protection maritime region for China’s southeast economic golden zone, and in this way, the South China Sea issue’s resolution will become, relatively speaking, a lot easier.

Zhang Wenmu asserts that by controlling Taiwan, China can establish a maritime protection zone in the South China Sea. Chinese military facilities on Taiwan would presumably compliment China’s expanding South China Sea military facilities.

Furthermore, Zhang explains that once Taiwan is unified with the Mainland, China will be able to project its military power east through the Miyako Strait – the largest pass through Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain – and south through the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. The result, according to Zhang, would be the creation of a united naval defense zone sweeping from the Yellow Sea to the East China and South China Seas, linking China’s South China Sea islands with Taiwan Island and the Liaodong Peninsula. He states China’s power projection would also extend deep into the western Pacific, enabling People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) nuclear submarines to realize their full counterstrike potential and allowing for the advancement of PLAN aircraft carrier construction.

A related concern for Chinese strategists pertains to Japan’s historical desire to control Taiwan as a protective barrier and transport node. Zhu Zhongbo (朱中博), a scholar at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affair’s think tank, wrote in 2015 that Japan desires to utilize Taiwan’s unique geopolitical position in order to secure access to the area’s transport and energy routes and assist its resurgent maritime strategy. Zhu accuses Japan of harboring secret plans to forestall and prevent Taiwan’s peaceful reunification with the Mainland. He points to the U.S.-Japan alliance’s expanding geographical area of military concern and the 2013 Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement as evidence of malign intent. Zhang Wenmu puts forth similar warnings, stating that Japan aims to preserve access to the Taiwan Strait in order to advance its own South China Sea strategy. He even goes as far as to call the Taiwan region a core interest of Japan.

Even a preliminary open-source dive into Chinese language material shows that knowledgeable and government-affiliated PRC experts continue to view the Taiwan issue as not merely an internal matter, diplomatically sealed off from the world by Beijing’s One China policy. Indeed, it is viewed as a matter of grave geostrategic significance in the context of Beijing’s larger regional interests. No doubt similar views exist within China’s foreign policy decision-making apparatus. In the words of the CCP itself:

By understanding the Taiwan problem’s long-term nature and complexity from a geopolitical and geostrategic viewpoint, our knowledge can become even more profound, and even more in line with objective reality.

David Gitter is an independent research consultant on Chinese politics and foreign affairs. Sign up for his weekly intelligence report Party Watch, to follow the latest activities of the CCP. This article was originally published in The Diplomat on March 11, 2016. 

Ripe for Reinvigoration: The Japan-South Korea Security Relationship

(Source: Yonhap/Reuters)

By Samuel J. Mun

North Korea’s recent provocations and saber-rattling highlight the importance of Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) security cooperation once again. Over the past two months, North Korea detonated a nuclear bomb, tested ballistic missile technology, and threatened South Korea and the United States with a preemptive military strike. These developments, combined with a Japan-ROK political resolution and China’s reluctance to censure North Korea, have created an opening for Japan and South Korea to strengthen their ties and stabilize the Northeast Asian security landscape.

Six months ago, there was speculation that South Korea was gravitating into China’s “orbit” and away from Japan. Many worried when President Park Geun-hye attended a military parade in Beijing as part of her effort to encourage China to exert leverage against North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, relations between Japan and South Korea continued to suffer as politicized disputes over “comfort women” impeded any significant progress in improving their strained ties.

Today, Seoul interacts with Beijing and Tokyo in a different context. Last December, Japan and South Korea reached a historic agreement to resolve the “comfort women” issue, thus creating space for the two countries to improve security ties. Not long after, Seoul’s relations with Beijing chilled when China chose not to exercise its leverage over North Korea in wake of North Korea’s detonation of a nuclear bomb. As an indicator of China’s reluctance to lend a hand, Xi Jinping apparently refused to take a phone call from Park for a month after the test. Weeks later, North Korea performed a rocket launch in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, after which China protested South Korea’s decision to enter discussions with the United States to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense platform to counter North Korean missiles.

South Korea is recalibrating its approach toward North Korea and now knows that China will not help the situation. It is turning to Japan as a reliable partner in this precarious security climate. Solidarity between Japan and South Korea was on display on February 10 when the respective military chiefs from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea agreed to “firmly respond to the [North Korean] acts utilizing trilateral information sharing” and “coordinate further on mutual security issues to enhance peace and stability in the region.” Less than a week later, President Park delivered a stern, nationally televised speech where she warned of North Korean collapse if North Korea continues its nuclear ambitions. As South Korea prepares for an end-game scenario in North Korea, Japan and South Korea are ideal partners for addressing the security and humanitarian challenges in such a contingency.

The maritime sphere is an excellent area for Japan and South Korea to forge these ties. Cooperation among the U.S. Navy (USN), Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) in areas such as ballistic missile defense, mine-countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare can help deter, and if necessary, defeat North Korea in wartime. JMSDF-ROKN coordination would also complement U.S. military operations in contingencies related to the Korean peninsula, buttress humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the event of North Korean collapse, and send a clear message to the region that they remain steadfast in standing up to North Korean aggression.

JMSDF-ROKN cooperation could lend opportunities for Japan and South Korea to coordinate with the U.S. Navy trilaterally in areas such as HADR, anti-piracy, and the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The free flow of trade in the South China Sea (SCS) is equally vital to Japan and South Korea, and a coordinated approach with the United States in the SCS would add resistance against China’s destabilizing activity in the region.

Now is an opportune moment to also consider revisiting the possible formulation of a Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The two countries were on the verge of signing a GSOMIA in 2012, but the hasty rollout of this agreement to the ROK National Assembly and public led to its collapse. The signing of a U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral information sharing agreement in 2014 was a step in the right direction, but a Japan-ROK GSOMIA would remove the United States as an intermediary and streamline the exchange of North Korea-related intelligence between Japan and South Korea.

As North Korea continues to refine its nuclear technology and missile capabilities, the time for Japan and South Korea to reinvigorate their security ties is overdue. The Japan-ROK relationship is a largely untapped resource that would bolster U.S., Japanese, and South Korean posture towards North Korea and the region at large. There should be no time wasted in harnessing the enormous potential of the Japan-ROK relationship.

This article was published in The Diplomat on February 27, 2016.  

Chinese Political Warfare After Taiwan's Elections: Tsai's Victory

By: Alison Bartel

This is the first in a series of blog posts entitled “Chinese Political Warfare After Taiwan's Elections."

(Source: Alison Bartel at KMT rally in Taipei)

DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen won the ROC (Republic of China, hereafter referred to as Taiwan) presidential elections on January 16, 2016 by a decisive margin. The election of a DPP leader has played into the CCP's fears of a more pro-independence populous in Taiwan.  Chinese leaders have historically employed coercive tactics in order to set the stage for reunification. As one of China’s primary “core interests,” the elections are likely to generate outbursts of more aggressive political warfare tactics if China perceives Taiwan as veering away from its desired course. As the Project 2049 Institute outlined in a previous report:

Political warfare seeks to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to one’s own political-military objectives.

Through interviews with DPP leaders, scholars, journalists, and academics on potential election outcome implications for the PRC (People’s Republic of China, hereafter referred to as China), this post serves to assess the PRC's future strategy to exert influence over Taiwan. The interviews indicate that China’s overall strategy will not change in response to the DPP victory itself, but instead will change as a function of fundamental shifts in demographics and political and cultural identity on the island.

China’s use of influence operations towards Taiwan has previously targeted those in political power (both KMT and DPP) and business tycoons, primarily by using economic leverages to wield its power. Taiwan and China are more economically interconnected than ever before, and in the short term, cross-Strait economic relations are unlikely to change significantly. China is a behemoth economy that has gone out of its way to bestow benefits on Taiwan’s businessmen (台商) and their new generation counterparts for both economic and political reasons. The Chinese market is in turn beneficial to Taiwan’s economy. But China’s recent stock market instability and the government’s response have made investors wary of its shortcomings. Furthermore, the race to the bottom (and growing potential of the TPP) could lead investors to diversify to Southeast Asian nations.

Though the two cultures are intertwined, the "One China" principle the PRC touts abroad further diverges from the reality of two separate societies and governments. As the old KMT order dies out, decades of independent governance and society have built a stronger Taiwanese national identity. President Tsai’s election is Taiwan’s third peaceful transition of power and it further solidifies Taiwan’s democratic political system. These trends imply that both of China’s traditional outlets of economic and cultural leverage are threatened in the long term. China's strategy will therefore gradually shift from targeting political and business heavyweights to Taiwanese youth, while incorporating more cultural leverage in the long term.

The success of Taiwan’s most recent elections was a milestone for democracy in the Asia-Pacific region. But China’s recent actions threaten to erode democracy and the rights that it embodies. The rise in bellicosity of China’s hard-line factions and divergence from mainstream rhetoric and policy should be monitored for potential rifts in China’s domestic politics. For example, coercive action behind Taiwanese K-pop star Chou Tzu-Yu’s apology and affirmation of the One China Principle on the eve of Taiwan’s presidential elections reveals China’s use of economic and cultural coercion that diverges from its seemingly warm language during the Ma-Xi meeting in November. In President Tsai’s victory speech, she notes that the PRC’s recent actions “will serve as a constant reminder to me about the importance of our country's strength and unity to those outside our borders.” While building a “consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-strait relationship,” Tsai’s administration should also be aware of changes in China’s political warfare strategy towards Taiwan. This series on deciphering China’s cross-Strait messaging strategies will identify cultural and economic areas to monitor for indications of changes in China’s perception management tactics on Taiwan.

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Sources:

Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics.” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, October 14, 2013, at http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf.

Chinese media leverages "false dilemma" fallacy against U.S. allies

(Photo Source: Express)

By: Alison Bartel

As the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK; or South Korea) deepened their alliances during President Park’s visit to Washington in late October, both through reaffirmation of strength of the alliance and through continued security cooperation, media sources in the People’s Republic of China (PRC; hereafter, China)were planting doubt about the longevity of the U.S.-ROK relationship. Similarly, during General Secretary Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the United Kingdom (UK), Chinese media portrayed the UK as caught between two allies, one on the rise and one in decline. One article at a time, through Party-run media outlets, the Chinese Communist Party is eliminating middle-ground solutions for complex diplomatic relations for U.S. allies. 

Propagating a zero-sum fallacy, also referred to as a “false dilemma fallacy” is a choice Chinese media warfare tactic. Chinese media, referencing guidelines from the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (CCPPD), regularly constructs current international events as scenarios with two choices, rather than a range of policy options. This institutionalized persuasion method is aimed at driving a wedge between the U.S. and its key allies by using zero-sum rhetoric, creating the illusion that allies must choose between the U.S. and China. Domestically and internationally, Chinese state-run media achieves this goal by using “foreign experts,” some of whom are influenced by or have significant interests in the Party, and some of whom are unaware they are being quoted or whose quotes are taken out of context. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese publicity apparatus also overemphasizes points of view that support the Party narrative.

Chinese media coverage of President Park’s visit to the U.S. as well as General Secretary Xi’s visit to the UK offer prominent examples of the “false dilemma” framing tactic and its implications for U.S. policy. 

President Park’s Visit to the U.S.

The ROK and China have seen much progress in relations over the past decade. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, has hosted President Park six times since 2013, and touted Park’s attendance at Beijing’s military parade in September. But the U.S. and South Korea share an alliance, robust economic relationship and democratic and free-market values. According to the White House Joint Fact Sheet released after Park’s visit, the two allies worked to strengthen cooperation in the following areas: defense of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea’s development of its own “Kill-Chain” preemptive strike system, South Korea’s potential membership in the TPP and countering China’s aggressive maneuvers in the South China Sea. Considering the dynamic nature of both relationships, it is in the ROK’s interests to nurture relationships with both the U.S. and China.

Chinese media paints a different picture. There is a large gulf between the “win-win” rhetoric of Chinese diplomats and China’s media coverage of South Korean foreign affairs. During a press conference on Park’s visit on October 16, President Obama urged Park to “speak out” when China violated international norms. Initial media uproar from Chinese and South Korean sources alike prompted the Park administration to defend the comments, citing Obama’s principled concern with upholding international law. Chinese media sources, however, were quick to parse the perceived faceoff between China and the U.S. over South Korean alliance. Articles with a wider focus attributed Obama’s comments to the U.S.’ growing unease over stronger China- South Korea relations. Carefully selecting quotes from Korean news sources, the articles both validated the negative effect of stronger China-ROK ties on ROK-U.S. relations. Then the articles followed with praise of the historic trend of ever-strengthening China-ROK relations that began prior to President Park’s time in office. Others were more biting, citing South Korea’s security dependence on China as evidence that even under an assumed China-US dichotomy, South Korea would have no choice but to side with China for nuclear negotiations with North Korea

While the stronger ROK-China relationship has “raised eyebrows” in Washington, the alarmist narrative of South Korea’s growing relationship with China at the expense of its relationship with the U.S. was not U.S. media’s primary focus following President Park’s visit. Reporting on the same press conference referred to above, U.S. media  emphasized the possibility of the ROK maintaining strong partnerships with both the U.S. and China. During the same press conference mentioned above, in addition to his comments on the South China Sea issue, President Obama also stated, “There’s no contradiction between the Republic of Korea having good relations with us, being a central part of our alliance and having good relations with China.” Chinese media neglected to report this caveat. It’s clear that though South Korea may be fostering closer relations with China, its current partnership with the U.S. is indispensable, and due to its strategic interests, it is unlikely that Korea will ostracize one ally in favor of the other.

General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Visit to the United Kingdom

Chinese Party-run media used similar tactics to frame Xi’s October 20-23 state visit to the UK. Utilizing another tactic of highlighting favorable perspectives that the Chinese media deems beneficial to China’s international interests, media reports promote the friendly views of its “foreign friends.” A long-standing tool dating from China’s Maoist propaganda roots in Yan’an, the tactic of “borrowing” foreign news sources allows the PRC to raise awareness of its narrative on a credible platform while increasing the efficiency of that narrative’s dissemination (Brady 2015).

For example, an article published during Xi’s visit titled “China is rising, America is declining, England is choosing,” was indicative of the CCP’s promotion of false dilemmas. Even more telling is the source. The named article was a translated version of Martin Jacques’ commentary in the Guardian where he argued that Britain cannot afford to pass up economic cooperation with China. The English version is illustrative of Chinese influence operations in itself, as Martin Jacques is a prominent China proponent and was once editor of Communist Party of Great Britain's journal, Marxism Today. The translated version, of course, makes some changes, editing out Jacques’ human rights concerns and any doubt whatsoever about an existing dichotomy. 

Implications for the United States

The prominence of Chinese media’s “false dilemma” messaging strategy, as well as China’s  specific methods for implementing this tactic calls for increased awareness of media agencies’ funding sources, credibility and background of sources quoted in media coverage. Conventional knowledge expects the Chinese government-backed publications to tow the CCP line, but U.S. audiences often take for granted China’s growing influence in non-CCP publications. Foreign audiences consistently fail to calculate the impact of Chinese propaganda, which exists not only in Chinese state-run publications, but also in rhetoric and ideas that trickle into publications around the world. Though subtle, the false dilemma narrative uses zero-sum language that creates a two-choice illusion, tacitly restricting policymaker options in maintaining alliances in East Asia. Ironically, the same government that accuses the U.S. of having a “deeply-rooted Cold War mentality” is using its media to make strides towards reconstructing such a policy environment.


Sources:

Brady, A.(2015). China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine. Journal of Democracy 26(4), 51-59. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved December 11, 2015, from Project MUSE database.

The South China Sea is Not Beijing's Next Battlefield

(Image Source: Wikimedia/U.S. Coast Guard )

By: Ian Easton

No one likes to admit they made a mistake, especially in Washington.  But what if America's top strategic thinkers have gotten China's military buildup all wrong?

The definition of military deception is "actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers...thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the mission." Could Beijing be using the South China Sea to this end?  By creating a constant stream of provocations in an area it cares relatively little about, China has diverted attention from an area it cares a lot about.  This could be leading the Pentagon toward bad planning assumptions and investments.  

The South China Sea Pivot

Since at least 2011 many of America's leading thinkers have become convinced that the South China Sea will dominate military and security affairs in the 21st century.  It is the new battleground, the Fulda Gap with Asian characteristics.  China's South Sea Fleet is the new Soviet 8th Guards Army.  Or so many have come to believe.

The Pentagon and State Department, as a result, have urgently ramped up their efforts to meet the new threat.  Special operations forces, diplomats, and congressional delegations have poured onto the scene, eager to play their roles in this new great game.  White House sanctioned security assistance and top-level visits have followed close behind.

This regional influence campaign has resulted in a breathtaking series of breakthroughs.  Burma has been re-opened for business.  Vietnam, having its arms embargo relaxed, has become a security partner.  U.S. Navy ships, fresh from dockyards in America, have taken up station in Singapore, ready to sally forth in an emergency.  The Marine Corps has established a strong presence in the Philippines and Australia.  Air Force fighters, bombers, and drones now shadow the skies above.  The horizon seems limitless for American geostrategic positioning across Southeast Asia. 

China seems more than willing to validate foreign fears.  Indeed, Beijing has turned up the volume on its strategic messaging system to full blast.  Washington foreign policy elites have been inundated with aggressive Chinese messages about the key importance of the South China Sea.  Just to make sure the point is fully understood, China has provoked a series of incidents with U.S. Navy ships in the area.  China has also preyed on vulnerable fishing boats in waters claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam.    

Most shockingly, China has built a number of manmade islands in the disputed waters.  It is now rapidly turning them into military outposts.  Semi-submerged reefs and rock features, once labeled "dangerous grounds" on maritime maps, now appear dangerous for a very different reason.

Each of Beijing's moves appears carefully calibrated to maximize foreign fear and minimize Chinese risk.  Nothing has happened  in this war of nerves that might result in a shooting war.  China knows it would lose such a fight.  But more important, and often missed by observers, the South China Sea is not a top priority. 

China's Main War Plan

China's military buildup is about Taiwan, not the South China Sea.  According to reports from the Pentagon and Office of Naval Intelligence, conquering Taiwan is the core mission that drives the People's Liberation Army (PLA).  Why? Because China's authoritarian leadership is deeply insecure.  Beijing views the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan), which exists as a independent and sovereign state, to be a grave threat to the communist party's vice grip on power.  Taiwan is dangerous because it serves as a beacon of freedom for Chinese speaking people everywhere. 

Taiwan is also a problem for China because it has a close defense and security relationship with the U.S. military.  There are over 3,300 Department of Defense visits to Taiwan a year.  And that number is growing fast.  In addition, a remarkable number of Taiwanese military personnel study and train in America, probably more than any other foreign country.  From Beijing's perspective, China's historic rise as a great power will not be complete until it can wrest Taiwan out of America's sphere of influence.  Only then can China break through the first island chain to become a regional hegemon, dominating Japan and South Korea.   

According to authoritative Chinese writings, the PLA focuses surprisingly little on the East Asian seascape.  The Science of Military Strategy is the most detailed and credible document available on Chinese military thought.  It takes pains to underscore the prime importance of land, not water.  China's "main strategic direction" (a euphemism for supreme national objective) is the invasion and occupation of Taiwan's entire territory.  Second order campaigns involve conflicts along China's 14 land borders.  Here the PLA is talking mostly about war with India.  Neither island disputes nor sea lanes are a critical priority.   

The Science of Military Strategy makes clear that PLA ground forces would play the leading role in a Taiwan campaign.  The ground forces, as a result, enjoy pride of place in the Chinese military.  That's one reason why infantry, tank, and amphibious units led the way at China's recent national day parade. The PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery (China's strategic rocket troops) follow the ground forces in protocol order.  Their envisioned roles are to support the Army's needs. 

Each Chinese fighting service and branch considers the invasion of Taiwan their principal mission.  The Science of Military Strategy reveals the operation would involve information attacks (electronic and cyber warfare), missile bombardments, air strikes, sea blockades, and surprise amphibious landings.  The ground force is expected to face the brunt of the bloody battle, fighting from the coast into Taiwan's dense urban centers and mountains.  Assuming victory, the Army is also responsible for pacifying a post-war Taiwan, turning it into a Orwellian police state.     

The PLA Navy's mission is to support the invasion of Taiwan.  It would be responsible for executing naval blockade operations; providing air defense and transport ships for the invasion armada; shelling the coast; clearing mines and beach obstacles; and deterring, delaying, or disrupting American aircraft carrier groups.  These are all highly difficult tasks.  Most of these missions are probably outside China's grasp and will be for some time to come.     

It is little wonder then that the PLA Navy and Air Force view the safeguarding of China's island sovereignty as third order missions.  The PLA ground force, the team's star player, does not consider it a mission at all.  Nor does the Second Artillery.  Those who think the South China Sea is driving Beijing's military spending spree are missing the point.                       

Implications for America  

There are political, military, and legal implications of China's strategy for the United States.  By stirring up trouble in the South China Sea, China keeps American policymakers looking at the wrong problem set.  Beijing's motives, of course, are unknowable.  But the effects of its actions are plain to see.  More and more Americans are being drawn toward a place where China has an advantage and can exact leverage.  It is easy to negotiate, or not negotiate, when the outcome matters greatly to the other side and little to your side.  China might care less about the South China Sea than the United States and her allies do.  

Annexing Taiwan is vastly more important for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership.  It is China's weakest and most vulnerable point.  Beijing hides this by spreading misinformation about Taiwan.  One example includes the notion that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are moving more closely together economically, so political unification is inevitable.  In reality, nothing could be farther from the truth.  The CCP's policies toward Taiwan are failing miserably.  Recent polling data reveals that unification never been more unpopular in Taiwan than it is today. 

Another common misperception is that the balance of military power has shifted decisively in the Taiwan Strait.  If that were true, as China's propaganda machine would have us believe, the PLA could invade Taiwan anytime it wanted.  However, recent studies on Taiwan's air and naval defense capabilities reveal that the ROC military is a whole lot tougher than it generally gets credit for.  China knows there is a long road ahead before it can credibly threaten Taiwan with invasion.  And Uncle Sam can tip the scales at any time.

Washington, it seems, has been influenced by China's misinformation campaign.  War games, exercises, and studies now focus on the South China Sea at the expense of Taiwan.  As a result, there is a large and growing asymmetry of knowledge and information regarding Taiwan scenarios.  The PLA has legions of Taiwan experts.  The Pentagon has a dwindling handful.

The U.S. government has self-imposed restrictions that make the problem even worse.  Navy ships are prohibited from docking in Taiwan's harbors, even in the event of severe weather.  More absurd still, admirals and general are not allowed to visit Taiwan and meet the men whom they would be expected to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with in a war.  In a crisis, the President of the United States is going to be on the phone with commanders in Hawaii who, while otherwise superb, have no firsthand knowledge of the battlefield.                   

Much of the hardware needed for fighting China in the defense of Taiwan has been put on the backburner as well.  Despite the obvious threat, front-line American war fighting assets in the Western Pacific, from satellites to command posts to aircraft hangars, remain unhardened.  U.S. forces are woefully behind the PLA in long-range anti-ship missiles.  The littoral combat ship is being deployed to Asia first, not frigates and destroyers capable of high intensity combat.  Clearly some planning assumptions have been made which favor the South China Sea over a Taiwan scenario.

The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) mandates that, "It is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity...to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic system, of the people of Taiwan."  The Pacific Command, by law, must be able to certify an ability to defend Taiwan in the most stressful situations imaginable.  That is why operational concepts like Air-Sea Battle/JAM-GC are so important.  Yet studies show that not enough human software and military hardware are being programmed to keep pace with this increasingly difficult mission.        

China's actions are moving minds toward the South China Sea and away from its true strategic objective.  This may be purposeful.  If true, that would be disquieting and unwelcome news. But even if it is not, America's policies and military thinking still risk being compromised by the tyranny of the inbox. Without a better understanding of what really animates China's military buildup, the U.S. security position could weaken, and the prospects for a peaceful and stable East Asia could grow ever more remote.  It is time for the U.S. government to rebalance to the Taiwan Strait.        

Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. This article was originally published in The National Interest on September 19, 2015.  

Chinese Media Warfare Targets the U.S.-Japan Alliance

(Image source: www.uscnpm.org)

By Sabrina Tsai

On May 29, 2015, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai warned that U.S. alliances in Asia are being perceived as "anti-China." Positing that some in China do not see territorial disputes in the region as sufficient reason for military alliances, he warned that it is detrimental to U.S. interests that Chinese citizens perceive the U.S. as against them. A rhetorical warning such as this one from Chinese officials point to the bigger questions of how China views U.S. alliances in the region and, more importantly, what China is doing to influence these alliances through political operations.

Chinese Political Warfare

Aside from Chinese intransigence on recognizing its adversarial activities as hostile in the regional security environment -- such as land reclamation in the South China Sea and the arms buildup across the Taiwan Strait -- it consistently engages in psychological warfare to shape the way world events are viewed both at home and abroad. A favorite target of the Chinese state-run media is the U.S.-Japan alliance. In 2015, the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, China has ramped up its media and information campaigns to undermine the health and progress made between Japan and its partners since 1945. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) concerted efforts to commemorate the end of the "world anti-fascist war" intentionally emphasize Japan's wartime legacy instead of regional advancements. In a world of power politics, soft power and hard power maneuvers are conjoined to create a desired political outcome. In the case of China, this is not amiss. 

While psychological-political components are inherent in every diplomatic, economic, and military instrument of national power,[1] China employs a peacetime information campaign that  target individuals' unconscious framework for viewing the world, including its own citizens. Referred to by some as the "Three Warfares," which includes media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, Chinese political warfare encompasses a large umbrella of networked state actors who drive the creation and transmission of information to targeted audiences.  Media warfare is an extended tradition of the CCP and a powerful political tool designed to sway the audience toward a state-sanctioned national narrative. Ranked 176 out of 180 by a French-based watchdog group Reporters Without Borders, China's press freedom is among the worst in the world and is highly controlled by the state for political ends.

Targeting the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Certain thematic trends can be found in the Chinese media in framing events related to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chinese reporting follows specific themes in order to influence and manage the perceptions of domestic audiences. They utilize the following thematic perception management tactics:

Highlighting regional expert commentators whose views are favorable to the CCP. In critiquing the U.S.-Japan alliance, Chinese media often uses opinions of experts or reporters from Japan and the region whose views align with their own. For example, Chinese reports have highlighted Australian expert Hugh White's criticisms on Japan's efforts to reform security policies, further stating that if Japan was to go to war with China, it would not have a decisive victory since it is uncertain whether the U.S. would actually follow through on its defense commitments to Japan during wartime.

Utilizing opposing voices in Japan's democratic society to its own political advantage. Japan's democratic society is backed by mature political institutions and civil society. With the freedom of expression, Japan's populace with opposing views have the latitude and platform they need in order to make their political opinions heard. Chinese media often capitalizes on views found within the pluralist society that favor its political positions. In analyzing Prime Minister Abe's motives for his policies, Chinese media highlights Japan's domestic opposition to legitimize its allegations of PM Abe's intentions as devious at its core.

Controlling how international events related to Chinese interests are covered. Chinese media regularly covers international events that relate to its national interests in a way that presents its side as just to the domestic Chinese audience. For example, a statement of concern released by G-7 summit conveners regarding heightened tensions in the South China Sea was covered by the Chinese media as a "Japanese effort" to "defame" China through a multilateral forum. Tactics like this one is commonly used to shape perceptions within China as a part of its overall psychological warfare. In order to win future wars, CCP leaders know that it would have to mobilize the populace, and peacetime information dissemination helps to ready the mentality of the nation against a specific, common enemy.

Commanding personal attacks on individual American and Japanese leaders. In addition to a relentless overhaul of reports criticizing PM Abe through attacks on his character, the CCP has also mobilized ad-hominem attacks against U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Combatant Commander Admiral Harry Harris for his Japanese heritage. Chinese reporting of U.S. military statements and surveillance of China's land reclamation activities in the South China Sea have pinpointed Admiral Harris' Japanese ethnicity as the driving impetus for "hawkish" policies against Chinese escalations. USPACOM cooperation with Japanese forces have been covered in a way that implies that Admiral Harris has a personal vendetta against the Chinese military simply because of his heritage. Such racist ad-hominem attacks on key U.S. leaders reveal the CCP's political interests in managing domestic perceptions through psychological warfare.

While these four perception management tactics are not comprehensive, they cover basic trends utilized by state-controlled Chinese media outlets as a part of its psychological-political warfare against the U.S.-Japan alliance among its domestic audience. These tactics, some more blatantly inappropriate than others (e.g., racism), are unlikely to abate in the near future. The U.S. would be wise to monitor Chinese political warfare tactics more closely in order to strengthen its understanding and preparedness against unwanted political operations aimed at weakening its alliance partnerships.

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[1] Fred Ikle, "The Modern Context," in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations, ed. by Frank Barnett and Carnes Lord. (National Defense University Press, 1989), pg. 20, at http://www.dresmara.ro/resources/carti/PWPOR.pdf