Roots of Turmoil in Xinjiang: The Socioeconomic Divide between Uyghurs and Han Chinese

Posted on Friday, June 27, 2014 by Liana Tai

The Second Central Work Forum on Xinjiang (East Turkestan) was held in May of this year, amidst a surge in protest and violent attacks by some segments of the Uyghur people that have been publicly labeled as a “religious separatist movement” by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Prominent Xinjiang scholar James Liebold notes that the Party’s acknowledgement of a need for change in policy is not explicitly stated in the dialogue of the Work Forum, yet seems to be signified by both the timing of the meeting and changes in rhetoric. As stated in China Daily, “[the CCP’s] strategy is proven to be correct and must be continued in the long run.” However, they must also “update [their] policies to Xinjiang’s current situations.”The First Central Work Forum was held in 2010 and its purpose had been to chart a five-year plan for economic prosperity and stability. As a whole, the region has prospered economically. However, the core of instability lies in the question of who has – and who has not -- prospered from the region’s growth. Four factors of the socioeconomic divide between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese in Xinjiang reveal the deeper causes of unrest in the region.

First is the lack of engagement of Uyghur locals in the CCP’s creation and implementation of economic policies in their own region. The top-down, state-led approach to economic development has engaged primarily high-level government and military officials and even experts from other regions, many of whom are unfamiliar and disconnected with the local conditions in Xinjiang and the needs of its people. It is therefore no surprise that Uyghurs are at a disadvantaged position to benefit from the fruit of these development policies. As the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) notes, “continuing marginalization and alienation of Uyghurs from the benefits of economic growth in East Turkestan and in China, as well as the cycle of security crackdowns, is ultimately contrary to the interests of stability in the region and appears only likely to feed resentment of the kind that has led to the unrest of July 2009.”

Second, the mass in-migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang province (both state-sponsored and self-initiated) has also had a tremendous impact on the prospects of economic growth for Uyghur groups. While the Han Chinese comprised just 6 percent of Xinjiang’s population in 1949, they represented 39 percent of its people by 2010. Originally, migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang was supported by the state in an effort to increase Beijing’s influence in that region. Additionally, Beijing wanted a larger Han population to facilitate negotiations with foreign oil companies and develop Western China as a bridge with Central Asia. Recently, there has been a greater self-initiated move on the part of Han Chinese to migrate to Xinjiang for new economic opportunities presented by a higher rate of urbanization and growth in the region. Often, these migrants do not have a high level of education and are willing to accept low wages. This has exacerbated the Uyghurs’ inability to access jobs, even those at the bottom end of the economic scale.   

Third, one of the most significant factors underlying the growing socioeconomic divide between Uyghurs and Han Chinese is the disproportionate growth resulting from “leapfrog development,” a term at the forefront of objectives during the First Central Work Forum on Xinjiang in 2010. As part of promoting “leapfrog development,” the Chinese government has increasingly promoted the privatization of state-owned enterprises and opened the economy to market forces. According to a study by the Population Studies Center at the University of Michigan, this transition has fostered greater opportunities for business development and economic growth in Xinjiang; however, the benefits of that growth have accrued to Han locals and Han migrants in the region, squeezing Uyghurs increasingly into self-employment.

The only segment of the economy where Uyghurs’ earnings are on a par with those of the Han Chinese is in the government sector, reflecting the state’s direct role in promoting “ethnic equality.” In contrast, ethnic inequality is greatest in those segments of the economy where the state is no longer playing a major role. Han locals and migrants are more likely to work in both public and private enterprises than Uyghurs.  Uyghurs have very little representation in the private sector outside of informal trade. Since the private sector (albeit still small) is the area where employment prospects are growing most rapidly, it is no wonder that Uyghurs feel a sense of frustration and disillusionment.

Lastly, the spatial distribution of ethnic groups is equally divided in Xinjiang. The Han Chinese live predominately in the urbanized northeast part of the region, the focal point of state investment and industrial development, as well as the hub of the region’s growing private sector activity. In contrast, the Uyghurs live primarily in southwest Xinjiang, a region that is far more rural and agricultural. As a result, the wealth generated by the “leapfrog development” initiative, primarily by Han-owned enterprises, is geographically separated from the Uyghurs as well.

The “leapfrog development” policy that was previously at the forefront of CCP objectives in Xinjiang was barely mentioned at the Second Central Work Forum. Economic development remains an important priority, yet this shift in terminology could signify Beijing’s recognition that lessening government involvement in the economy is not conducive to promoting stability in the region. While specific changes in Xinjiang policy remain to be seen, President Xi Jinping’s call for “walls made of copper and steel” and “nets spread from the earth to the sky” to address instability in the region suggest that the reins on a top-down, state-led approach will only be drawn tighter in the future. And, with this approach, the stability that the Party wishes for will remain little more than a wish. 

South Korea-China Relations: Limits of the “Strategic Cooperative Partnership”

Posted on Tuesday, May 27, 2014 by Samuel J. Mun

Over the past two decades, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have developed a “strategic cooperative partnership” reflected through a sharp increase in bilateral trade, security dialogues, and more recently, frequent discussions on China’s potential role in addressing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. However, while the ROK-PRC partnership is at a historic high point, this relationship faces significant obstacles. These limitations in their ties reinforce the paramount importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance in face of a belligerent North Korea and rising China.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s state visit to China in 2013 demonstrated the immense progress made in ROK-PRC relations since the two countries normalized ties in 1992. Today, South Korea’s trade volume with China has grown to exceed its bilateral trade with the United States and Japan combined, and negotiations for a South Korea-China free trade agreement by 2015 were prioritized during the summit between President Park and President Xi. The two leaders also agreed to establish a high-level security dialogue between Seoul and Beijing and issued a joint-statement calling for the denuclearization of North Korea.

South Korea’s interest in building its partnership with China also goes beyond economic ties and China’s apparent leverage in reining in North Korea. Another source of overlap and agreement between Seoul and Beijing is their shared discord with Japan, against whom they share historical animosities related to Japan’s colonial and wartime legacies in the first half of the 20th century. For example, China’s opening of an exhibition (a request made by Park during her 2013 state visit to China) commemorating Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean who assassinated the first Japanese overseer of colonial Korea, showed further ROK-PRC alignment despite U.S. efforts to promote cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

Although political and economic ties between Seoul and Beijing are warm, decision-makers in Seoul must remain cognizant of Beijing’s strategic goals in the region that are inherently antithetical to South Korea’s security interests. In other words, Chinese efforts to alter the regional status quo and undermine the U.S.-led security architecture in Northeast Asia hinder South Korea’s ability to defend itself from North Korea, which remains an existential threat to South Korea.

China’s efforts to stifle South Korea’s cooperation with the United States—South Korea’s sole security guarantor for over 60 years—highlights the limits of the South Korea-China relationship. For example, in response to annual U.S.-ROK joint military drills intended to increase deterrence against North Korea and improve interoperability, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying asserted that “China is opposed to any move that may result in tensions in the region, whether they be joint drills or the threat of conducting nuclear tests.” Furthermore, at a conference this month in Shanghai, Xi Jinping warned against the strengthening of alliances in the region. And while Xi did not mention the United States, it was clear that he was in part referring to U.S. efforts to improve trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.

It is this very mechanism, however, that directly lends to greater deterrence and preparedness against North Korean provocations and bellicosity. U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and ballistic missile defense will be critical in a military contingency on the Korean peninsula. South Korea and China may empathize with each other’s experience under Japanese colonial rule, but South Korea’s security environment demands that it coordinate more closely with the United States and Japan on security issues. Such coordination is salient particularly for scenarios where the United States will launch operations on and around the Korean peninsula from its bases in Japan.

To what extent will South Korea continue to build ties with China? Public opinion polls by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies from March 2014 indicate that “70.4% of South Koreans [state] that Korea should strengthen the alliance with the United States to check China,” and “53.4% agreed that Korea should strengthen the alliance with the United States even at the risk of making China uncomfortable.” The polling data also suggests that warm South Korea-China ties may not necessarily translate into substantial security cooperation, as China’s reluctance to condemn North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 are not too distant memories for South Koreans who sought China’s support in censuring North Korea.

As the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific in response to China's rise, South Korea’s proverbial status as a “shrimp among whales” is increasingly relevant. Despite Seoul’s recent political and economic leanings toward Beijing, divergent regional security interests reveal clear limits in how far South Korea can balance toward China. Conversely, the U.S.-ROK alliance since 1953 has deterred war on the Korean peninsula and evolved into a “global partnership” rooted in shared values and strategic interests. As such, the U.S.-ROK alliance will remain the indispensable element to South Korea’s security and prosperity for the foreseeable future.

Washington Should Highlight US-Taiwan Engagement Efforts

Posted on Friday, April 18, 2014 by Sabrina Tsai

The first Cabinet-level visit by a US official in 14 years: Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou met US Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy on Monday, April 14, 2014. Photo: EPA 

By Sabrina Tsai

Quiet Engagement

In Washington, government-to-government, military-to-military, and people-to-people interactions with the Republic of China (ROC; or Taiwan) have been relatively quiet due to long-standing policy practice and growing attention being focused on the People’s Republic of China (PRC; or China). However, as a friend of the government and people of Taiwan, the US should do a better job at publicizing its engagement efforts with Taiwan, such as the separate visits made by three deputy assistant secretaries from the Departments of State and Commerce during the last week of March and this week’s Cabinet-level visit by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Indeed, Washington should reconsider its past and current approach of keeping engagements with Taiwan quiet and low-key. US interlocutors should be open and transparent in their dealings with Taiwan in order to highlight meetings as routine and normal interactions. This would contribute to a better understanding of US-Taiwan relations among the general public as well as the policy community and help avoid the risk of the security and trade partnership being undermined by the strengthening of US-China ties.

Why Publicize US-Taiwan Engagement Efforts?

US-Taiwan cooperation is an important part of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. People-to-people, government-to-government, and military-to-military exchanges have the power to shape and color public perceptions not only in the US and Taiwan, but also in the PRC. Knowledge and perceptions of US-Taiwan engagement have influence over how policymakers think in Washington, Taipei, and Beijing, and could create misperceptions if the basic facts of US-Taiwan engagements are unknown due to the information being under-publicized or not readily available to the general public. While some may argue that US-Taiwan cooperation should be kept quiet and under-the-radar due to both Beijing’s sensitivities toward Taiwan and Washington’s aversion to political pressure from China (such as that experienced by US administrations when congressional notifications of Taiwan arms sales are delivered), the near silence that characterizes US-Taiwan efforts of cooperation has born several negative effects.

First, ROC officials and leaders are left to wonder about the strength and vitality of the US commitment to assist Taiwan’s defense needs vis-à-vis China’s growing military strength and capabilities across the Strait. The reluctance of US leaders to publicly announce engagements with Taiwan make the impression that the US could waver from its commitments outlined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to assist in meeting Taiwan’s defensive capability needs.

Second, the general public as well as more seasoned observers in both the US and in the region are likely to have the perception that US ties with Taiwan are negligible in comparison to US ties with the PRC. The quietness of US-Taiwan cooperation amidst of growing publicity for US-China engagements create the misperception that the US may abandon Taiwan in future conflict scenarios across the Taiwan Strait in favor of closer ties with mainland China. US security commitment to Taiwan under the TRA should be reaffirmed to public observers by steps to boldly publicize US-Taiwan efforts of cooperation.

Third, the quietness of US-Taiwan engagements has a negative effect on US-China relations by creating the misperception that US support for Taiwan is weak. The importance for Washington to signal its support for Taiwan to Beijing by publicizing regular engagements with Taipei cannot be overstated. Increased publicity of regular interactions helps to counter the object of Chinese political warfare aiming to shape public perceptions about US-Taiwan relations favorable to Chinese dispositions. As a vibrant democracy with 23 million people and an important trade partner, Taiwan matters to the US, a fact that cannot be undermined as Washington works on closer cooperation with leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The quietness of US-Taiwan interactions gives Beijing the impression that Washington is willing to compromise its security partnership with Taiwan, hence emboldening Chinese activities in the region. With territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea ongoing, Washington cannot afford to edge China on to more aggressive behavior through the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that would jeopardize regional stability.

Looking Forward

Despite concerns of over-publicizing US-Taiwan engagement, the US should work to be more open and transparent in its dealings with Taiwan, highlighting regular meetings as normal interactions for two legitimate governments. Due to the heavy emphasis on US-China engagement efforts reflected by the media and the policymaking community, scarce public attention given to US-Taiwan engagement coupled by a low-key disposition of US policymakers on Taiwan have contributed to little attention being cast on one of the most important security partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. 

5 Faulty Assumptions About Taiwan

Posted on Monday, March 10, 2014 by Admin

By Dan Blumenthal

Photo: MARK RALSTON/AFP/Getty Images
The government-to-government talks between Wang Yu-chi, head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, and Zhang Zhijun, head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, are significant, but not for reasons many think. Indeed, the talks are most noteworthy because they happened at all. A key element of China's Taiwan policy has been to isolate the island and get all countries to accept the Chinese position that Taiwan is not a country, but a province of China.

Now Taiwan and China have had government-to-government talks. China has moved a step closer to accepting Taiwan's de facto independent status as a country with its own national government. The substance of the talks will be far less noteworthy as Taiwan does not want to make any concessions or agreements on political issues such as its international status.

U.S. policymakers should insist that this is now the precedent: China has to work out its differences with Taiwan on a government-to-government basis. The talks also provide us a chance to reflect on five faultyassumptions about Taiwan, many developed during and since the normalization process with China in the 1970s. Here they are:

 1. Taiwan and China would reunify after a "decent interval." This belief goes back to then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in his meetings with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during the early stages of U.S. President Richard Nixon's opening to China (It was Nixon's opening: Kissinger thought Nixon odd for even suggesting an opening to China.) Kissinger told Zhou that the "political evolution" of Taiwan would proceed "in the direction" that Zhou wanted, meaning toward unification with the "motherland." He also said that the United Stated would not stand in the way of that "evolution."

Oops. Today Taiwan is standing tall as a de facto independent democracy with an elected president, a national legislature, and a national military. Kissinger and many of his successors were just wrong. The Taiwan example is a damning case of how misguided "realism" can be. A cacophony of supporters -- a bipartisan group of congressmen, anti-communist groups, democracy supporters, and, foremost, the Taiwanese people themselves -- banded together to make sure that the "political evolution" of Taiwan proceeded in a direction opposite of what Kissinger assumed. (There are still books to be written about how wrong Kissinger was about Asia and about how the sloppy normalization process created many of the problems in Asia that we live with today.)

Kissinger is a self-described realist. But his realism ignores important factors that drive international politics such as individual acts of leadership, beliefs in freedom and justice, and the importance of emotion and public desires.

2. Taiwan: Homo economicus. Related to No. 1, the unstated assumption in U.S. cross-strait policy after normalization has been that the Taiwanese are driven mostly by rational, material self-interest. The opening of China-Taiwan economic ties, a process that began two decades ago, was supposed to lead to some sort of political solution as Taiwan acted in its economic self-interest.

Well, Taiwan did invest heavily in China and in the process grew both the Chinese and Taiwanese economies. But as economic ties have expanded, the Taiwanese feel an ever stronger sense of uniqueness. Close contact did not make the heart grow fonder. The more contact the Taiwanese have with China, the more they feel different from the Chinese, including when it comes to the openness of their society and how modern and advanced Taiwan is compared with China. The other issue is a generational shift as fewer Taiwanese feel a historical emotional attachment to China. "Reunification" is now only possible for Beijing if it chooses to start a war.

3. Taiwan is dependent on China's economy; it must eventually accept unification. This is a cousin of point 2 above. The truth is that Taiwan and China are dependent on each other (and on the United States, Japan, and South Korea) to design and produce high-tech products. They are both highly dependent on other countries to buy those products. Yes, Taiwan developed a very sophisticated China strategy that made the mainland a key link on its high-tech supply chain. But Taiwanese businessmen are arguably the most agile in Asia.

If China becomes too risky or costly, Taiwanese business will move production elsewhere. To some extent this is already happening as Taiwanese business is making large investments in Vietnam, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Taiwan has many options.

The sad irony is that the only country that can marginalize the Taiwanese economy is the United States. How? By not allowing it into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). If Taiwan is excluded, other countries benefiting from lower tariffs will develop competitive advantages that could squeeze out high-end Taiwanese design and manufactures. Unfortunately, excluding Taiwan from the TPP appears to be the U.S. policy. Taiwan is not overly dependent on the Chinese economy. It is overly dependent on the political whims of Washington.

These three assumptions all have to do with how Taiwan got to where it is despite the exertions of our realists. The next faulty assumptions have to do with how to have a more realistic defense and deterrence policy in the Taiwan Strait that solidifies Taiwan's progress:

4. Taiwan will have the defense policy we want. Actually Taiwan will have the defense policy it wants. The United States currently insists that Taiwan abandon its previous strategy of engaging its enemy away from its shores and instead focus on defense of its homeland. The former strategy made a great deal of sense given that Taiwan suffers from a lack of strategic depth and is a maritime island, dependent on trade.

Now the United States insists that Taiwan withstand a potentially blistering missile and air campaign, not hit back, and focus only on preparing for a possible invasion of the island. This is both unwise and unrealistic. No democratic president can simply ask his people to hunker down and take a missile salvo. There would be enormous public pressure to hit back, in order to bolster national morale if nothing else. But the ability to hit back even in a limited fashion can work strategically as well.

Consider a fairly recent example: After a devastating air campaign by Israel in 2006, the fact that Hezbollah was still able to fire even crude rockets into Israel was a source of great frustration among the Israeli military and of terror among Israel's population. The belief among most observers is that Israel lost that war despite its superior military capabilities. Hezbollah was still able to reach out and touch Israel.

Taiwan's military wants to retain some ability to show its population that it can hit back, even if such a capability would not be decisive. A show of force of this kind would also signal to China that it has to pay a higher price in blood and treasure to achieve its political goals. Remember, a failure in national security policy can be very threatening to the Chinese Communist Party. While it could mean a Chinese escalation after an initial tactical failure, it could also mean that China would cut its losses after "making its point" and call it quits.

But Taiwan's military does not just want some strike capability to deter and embarrass China; it also needs the means to defend its airspace and break blockades. Here is how our faulty assumptions translate into policy: The United States insists that Taiwan does not need or cannot have an air force. But Taiwan's main procurement goal is new F-16s. The Taiwanese know that they need some ability to engage Chinese fighters and provide some protection over Taiwan. Taiwan's other big procurement goal is submarines. But after approving the sale of submarines to Taiwan, the United States has been sitting on Taiwan's request for submarines for 13 years. Taiwan has an open request for submarines that has been collecting dust in the interagency decision-making process. This is a moral and strategic outrage. Taiwan needs a very robust undersea warfare capability that could cause China big headaches in trying to track that capability.

If the United States not provide Taiwan with the defense capabilities it needs, it will likely develop more dangerous options (as it did in the 1980s). The point is that Taiwan's president will need to protect his people with any means he has, no matter what the Washington bureaucracy thinks.

5. We won't act to help Taiwan. This may be the most dangerous assumption of all. There is a sense of fatalism and defeatism combined with a notion that "unification is inevitable" setting in among foreign-and defense-policy observers in Washington and around the world.

The argument is that Taiwan is indefensible and that the United States won't risk its relations with China over Taiwan. But there is a credible argument that Washington gets into conflicts because potential adversaries underestimate U.S. willingness to abide by its commitments. It is worth remembering that the United States was not supposed to "die for Danzig," that Berlin did not seem worth it either in the Cold War, and that South Korea was outside the U.S. defense perimeter before the Korean War.

The United States is hard to read because of the diffusion and openness of its policymaking. And it may seem and even be unpredictable. But a defensible reading of history is that when the global balance of power is at stake, the United States reacts forcefully. If China started a war over Taiwan, all previous assumptions would be quickly dispatched, and fear, anxiety, emotion, a president's calculation over vital interests, and allied concern would all set in. It would be a mistake for China in particular to read too much into seeming U.S. complacency now. If Taiwan is under coercive threat, all calculations change. The United States wants to avoid a conflict; to do so, it cannot allow its benign negligence of Taiwan to be interpreted as a lessening of U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security.

The talks between the Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office prove that the supposedly master grand strategists, such as Kissinger and some his successors, were wrong about a major international issue. They simply did not factor in all the elements that drive international politics. When they assumed Taiwan away, they ignored Taiwan's will to exist and thrive, as well as broad U.S. public support for Taiwan. Now, whether by design or not, China has taken a step toward recognizing Taiwan's status in international politics. (It is sad and ironic that high-level Taiwanese officials can go to China but not the United States for high-level summitry). The talks will not lead to any substantive breakthrough, but they are a symbolic breakthrough. To avoid miscalculation and conflict, the United States would do well to fortify this gain and insist that the precedent has been set. Continued government-to-government talks between China and Taiwan should continue often and at all levels.

This is the road to a peaceful resolution of disputes between Beijing and Taipei. Meanwhile, the United States must keep its powder dry, read its own strategic history, and not self-deter by assuming the worst about the credibility of its own commitments. The United States must also realize that Taiwan will also continue to hedge by improving its defense capacity in its own way. The United States must be realistic about what a democracy must do to demonstrate its ability to defend itself and must stop the flights of fancy that have led to a current de facto arms-sales freeze. This sort of policy would serve U.S. interests and may even be realistic.

Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. This article was originally published in Foreign Policy on February 12, 2014. 

Taiwan’s China Policy: Struggles and Opportunities in Cross-party Cooperation

Posted on Thursday, March 6, 2014 by Lauren Duffy

By Lauren Duffy

Last month we witnessed unprecedented government-to-government talks between leaders of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in Nanjing. More recently, the head of Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), Chen Deming, recognized Taiwan’s same MAC Minister Wang, as ‘Minister,’ an indication of the Republic of China’s (ROC; Taiwan) political legitimacy.  Concurrently, speculation continues to circulate around the possibility of a summit between Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou and People’s Republic of China (PRC; China) leader Xi Jinping.

As cross-Strait relations begin to accelerate, a commonly supported China policy is paramount to ensuring constructive ROC-PRC negotiations. Taiwan’s top political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) are steadily working to achieve this objective. But while some progress has been made to encourage dialogue, internal divisions and policy ambiguities remain, further delaying consensus on how the nation should move forward.

Within the DPP, prospects for internal agreement are muddled by persistent divisions as policymakers continue to define and redefine Taiwan’s identity in terms of the ROC’s governing authority and how that relates to evolving relations with the mainland. In particular, Former Party Chair Tsai Ing-wen and Former Party Premier Frank Hsieh differ substantially on what Taiwan’s identity should look like. Tsai promotes a “The ROC is Taiwan, Taiwan is the ROC” strategy, an attempt to argue that Taiwan is not ruled by a non-native power. Hsieh however, a primary critic of the DPP’s recent China Policy Review, promotes a “two constitutions, different interpretations approach, in which the respective constitutions of the PRC and ROC govern different territories and share a unique relationship. According to recent polling, Hsieh’s position is gaining momentum and has been viewed by Washington and Beijing as tolerable and acceptable; however it failed to make it into the DPP’s China Policy Review consequent of its close similarities to the KMT’s 1992 Consensus.

Similarly, the KMT faces its own inconsistencies in policy and rhetoric. More specifically, last year Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan, who regularly visits the mainland, sparked debate in both the pan-blue and pan-green camps due to his comments on cross-Strait relations. Lien expressed, in a meeting with PRC leader Xi Jinping, his ambitions for "one China, cross-strait peace, mutually beneficial integration and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” While he also urged Beijing to recognize the ROC’s existence, many pro-independence DPP members were outraged and President Ma quickly pointed out that the comments that were made solely reflected Lien’s personal perspective. Likewise, prior to and following MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi’s meeting in Nanjing in early 2014, politicians expressed wariness over the terminology Wang might use and requested a briefing upon his return. Subsequently, while varying opinions on how relations should progress help to fuel healthy debate, in practice, their potential in sending mixed messages to Beijing could pose a serious dilemma in maintaining consistency and clarity in negotiations. Thus, in cases especially like Lien’s, a foundational understanding and agreement on Taiwan’s China objectives would help to enhance relations without exasperating them. 

Possibilities for compromise still exist. In January, the DPP published its China Policy Review, which outlined areas for enhancing and restraining relations to encourage engagement with China while stressing the need to protect Taiwan’s autonomy and technological edge. In particular, the DPP emphasized the degree and variety of debate that took place over the course of 9 meetings and public forums, and included 629 participants across the political spectrum. The party concluded that the meetings were best characterized as “the most comprehensive and thorough discussion of cross-Strait relations in Taiwan’s history.” Although the policy was plagued by many of the aforementioned discrepancies in the DPP’s cross-Strait policy, the policy review serves as a valuable benchmark for the party in facilitating dialogue to eventually reach a consensus on Taiwan’s China policy.

Thus, in an effort to bridge gaps and to establish a clear and coherent policy, serious consideration of the DPP’s recent efforts to produce a China policy, as well as looking to the agreements made at the 1996 National Development Conference, a multiparty convention that addressed Taiwan’s democratization and the future of cross-Strait relations, might serve as a healthy foundation for further discussion. Together, these two strategies would assist in bringing new ideas to the table, generating debate, and would cover a diverse and well-represented demographic of professionals, policy makers, and academics. The efforts that contributed to Taiwan’s present democratic system are a not so distant memory. Therefore, utilizing a similar model, one culminating a more contemporary structure of forums, would revitalize the conversation across party lines at a more informal level. Understandably, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan is the nation’s primary policy body. However, successful creation of a truly unified China Policy demands that deliberations be expanded to an even wider audience.

Ultimately, as the ROC continues down this road of engagement with the PRC, many hurdles will be met, characterized by fierce debates about the country’s economy, security, and in particular, its international legitimacy. As such, it is crucial that the nation’s key political parties establish common ground for discussing these issues, and attain solidarity in their policies toward Beijing. Doing so will not only help the Taiwanese people, but also those in China and the United States, to understand Taiwan’s core objectives and how to best engage one another for the foreseeable future. 

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