Under the Radar News 5.28.10
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia

The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) that wrapped up in Beijing yesterday should lead to the coining of a new diplomatic maxim: the bigger the delegation, the smaller the results. The State Department's outcomes document from the Dialogue is a laundry list of 26 items that most likely could have been “accomplished” without sending 200 US officials -- including 15 Cabinet secretaries and agency heads -- to China for several days of high-profile, low content meetings. Meanwhile, on the really important strategic and economic issues that should occupy center stage -- Iran, North Korea, global economic imbalances -- there appears to have been little movement despite persistent claims of a successful dialogue from both sides. In fact, China's equivocating response to North Korea's unprovoked sinking of a South Korean naval vessel is a good example of the continued wide gulf in the strategic considerations of the two countries.
While the Obama administration has hailed the S&ED -- a combination and dramatic expansion of two parallel high-level Bush-era dialogues with China -- as one of its "signature institutional innovations", other commentators have offered less flattering assessments. In an article hailing the end of “G2” thinking in the Obama Administration, leading China thinkers Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal from the Council on Foreign Relations advocate downsizing and refocusing the S&ED back to the truly strategic issues. Joshua Cooper Ramo, who coined the term "Beijing consensus" to describe the growing influence of China's economic and political model, goes further and calls for the S&ED to be abandoned altogether. He likens it to "an annual parent-teacher conference with China" that is too large and slow to deal meaningfully with the rapid and diverse challenges the US-China relationship encompasses. Instead, Ramo suggests a more flexible and fluid approach, with a "ruthless defense of American interests as the starting point."
There are merits to both of these approaches to fostering more effective bilateral engagement, but the more important aspect of their analyses is the emphasis on the inherent structural constraints on US-China relations. As the latest round of the S&ED ends with more pomp than substance, it is a good time to evaluate not only the means to engage China, but also the underlying expectations about the quality and ends of that engagement.
Photo: U.S. Department of State
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia
China has long viewed copper as a strategic resource. It is the demand for the metal in key industries, rather than its scarcity, that has warranted the premium placed upon it by policy planners and the extractive industry. For China, copper is also key to its development, which compounds the strategic value of this versatile metal.
Recently, China’s demand for the metal has been sustained by buoyant economic outlook and the government stimulus injection into copper intensive industries - electricity and construction. Its growing consumption amidst the global financial crisis left some market watchers speculating that China was seeking to diversify investments to hedge against depreciation of their dollar-based assets. At a time when U.S. treasury bonds were at risk of under-performing, China appeared to be investing in inflation-proof resources that can be directly used for driving its economic engine.
Projections for long-term copper demand in China are promising despite a winding down of government stimulus spending. In addition to likely expansion of the electricity system (currently accounting for over half the copper use) and the construction sector, future demand from the hybrid and electrical car industry may also be significant. As a “lifestyle metal” – copper consumption also correlates with improvements in quality of life. Therefore, increasing personal wealth and growing consumer market will likely spur the production of goods, particularly household appliances with copper components.
In anticipation of global economic recovery and future demand, the State Council announced a plan last year to consolidate the country’s metal industry into three to five large producers by 2011. Acquisitions are tentatively underway with the country’s top two producers, the provincially-owned Jiangxi Copper Corporation and Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group, being propositioned by leading state-owned miners Minmetals and Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco). If the deals are secured, it will bring the country’s top producers under the control of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration of China (SASAC), which is the majority stockholder in Minmetals and Chinalco. Bringing key players under the state-owned enterprises is undoubtedly a reflection of industry’s strategic nature. In the past, SASAC has focused on creating ‘national champions’ in key sectors and supporting their international investments in alignment with the state’s strategic interests.
In the long term, restructuring will enhance Chinese corporations’ standing in the global copper market. Streamlining the industry will provide the fewer, and more powerful, players with greater bargaining power on copper imports as well as enhance competition in the industry. The rise of a few copper giants may also consolidate capacity for international acquisitions or joint ventures to strengthen China’s global resource expansion.
Image source: China Daily

China deploys over a thousand short range ballistic missiles as well as almost 500 fighter and bomber aircraft opposite Taiwan. In the event of a conflict, China could seek air superiority over the Strait by mobilizing a full-scale missile bombardment against Taiwan’s airfields and fighter aircraft fleet. A 2009 RAND report predicted that if the first wave of missiles specifically targeted airbases, China would have a 90% chance of doing sufficient damage Taiwan’s runways to trap its fighters on the ground for hours. While the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) faces significant challenges in cross-Strait conflict scenarios, airbase survival appears to be a rising priority of Taiwan’s defense establishment.
Leveraging the island’s unique geography, the ROCAF has constructed a massive underground bunker at Chia-shan on Taiwan’s east coast to house up to 200 of its fighters. Taiwan has also constructed a second mountain bunker at Chih-hang Airbase, near Tai-tung, to protect an additional 60 fighters.
The ROCAF has also taken significant steps towards ensuring operability despite possible runway damage. ROCAF fighters are prepared for operating from sections of the national freeway system in a contingency. Taiwan has also invested in specialized equipment to reduce the impact of runway damage. In 2002, the ROCAF procured more than 300 rapid runway repair kits and holds regular runway repair exercises.
Engineering studies, however, have suggested that Taiwan requires better runway repair equipment to address its unique threat environment. Similarly, a 2006 survey assessed that existing systems have not met Taiwan’s technical requirements.
Indications exist that an indigenous effort may be underway to improve upon existing solutions. For example, Taiwan is researching advanced cementing technologies to quickly repair damaged runways, and outlining innovative methods to clear debris and unexploded ordnance. Taiwan has also conducted technical analysis of runway repair optimization and surveyed international approaches to the runway repair problem. Furthermore, development of electronic attack systems to counter ballistic and cruise missile terminal guidance systems is also under consideration.
U.S. assessments of Taiwan’s airbase survivability assume China will mount a full scale assault as a prelude to an amphibious invasion. Other analysts believe limited coercive use of force is a most likely scenario. Nevertheless, a conflict is less likely to be a long distance race between China’s missile forces and Taiwan’s runway repair capability, but a sprint aimed at achieving political goals rather than a complete military defeat of Taiwan. Responding to China’s strategic philosophy of “rapid war, rapid resolution,” Taiwan’s strategy focuses on “winning the first battle” rather than a war of attrition. While the challenge to Taiwan posed by Chinese missile forces is substantial, the ROCAF’s ability to sustain operations in a limited coercive conflict may be greater than expected.
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia

Last month, Malaysia passed a national export law aimed at curbing nuclear trafficking. The Strategic Trade Bill imposes prison terms of at least five years and million-dollar fines for those importing or exporting material that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction.
The bill marks an important step in Kuala Lumpur’s efforts to shed its reputation as a transshipment point for nuclear smuggling. Malaysia has been linked to illicit supplies of sensitive equipment to Libya in 2003 and Iran in 2008, and was one of the few remaining newly industrialized countries without stringent nuclear export controls. Arms control advocates had long argued that these infringements occurred due to the absence of strict export governance.
The move was also read as a last-ditch effort by Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak to avoid embarrassment, lest he attended last month’s Nuclear Security Summit empty-handed, particularly when he was also scheduled to meet President Obama on the sidelines of the summit.
The U.S. has welcomed the Strategic Trade Bill as part of a joint effort to stem proliferation and curb illicit WMD trafficking, praising Malaysia for taking a step to “remedy and close loopholes” in the U.S.-Malaysia relationship.
Yet it may be too early to conclude that Malaysia is serious about addressing non-proliferation and trafficking issues. As Mr. Najib himself noted, establishing the legal framework is “only the first step” in the process of fighting nuclear trafficking. For Malaysia, that first step alone has taken about five years, owing to “the complications in technical matters that had to be understood by all related ministries and agencies”. That suggests it could be several more years before the law is implemented by enforcement agencies, a worrying fact as Malaysia mulls building its own civilian nuclear plants by around 2021.
Kuala Lumpur will also have to balance its efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime with domestic imperatives, particularly given the fragile state of Mr. Najib’s ruling coalition, which has lost seven of the last ten by-elections held. This has already held particularly true with Iran given Malaysia’s status as a Muslim-majority nation. For instance, probably due to rising discontent at home, Mr. Najib denied that his country had cut off gasoline supplies to Iran, contradicting earlier statements by state oil firm Petronas, as well as his own comments in Washington. A similar confusion occurred last year when Malaysia initially voted against an IAEA resolution to censure Iran for building a secret second uranium-enrichment plant, but then, after U.S. pressure, dismissed its envoy and reversed its position.
All this suggests that the way forward for Malaysia’s counter-trafficking efforts remains unclear despite the passage of the Strategic Trade Bill.
Photo: Sulekha.com

Energy security and the urban-rural development gap are important problems for China to tackle. While more and more people are joining the middle class, about 10 million people in villages in the western and northern parts of the country are still struggling with the lack of basic commodities like electricity. China has recognized renewable energy, particularly the underdeveloped solar energy, as a solution to these challenges.
China has the geographical condition to realize the huge power potential of solar energy. Two-thirds of China, mainly in rural provinces of Gansu, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, consists of non-arable land that receives abundant sunlight. With significant concentrations of solar radiation per year (exceeding 140kcal/m2/hr and duration of over 2200 hours per year), the National Laboratory for Clean Energy estimates that China’s current energy requirement can be met by covering a third to half of these areas in solar cells and catching only one-tenth of the energy produced. Despite the staggering potential, solar power development has been lagging behind hydro and wind power because of the high price of solar power output, due to the lack of government subsidy and high cost of silicon-made solar cells.
Recently, several developments have raised prospects of a significant drop in solar power prices in China within the next decade. Several large solar plants are being built in those arid provinces, including the world’s largest solar plant in Inner Mongolia with a capacity of 2 gigawatts, which will start construction in June 2010 and is expected to be completed by 2019. There is also increasing government commitment to solar power. Last year, the Chinese government launched the first pilot program to subsidize 50-70% of the investment cost for 294 solar plants as well as a $2.93 per watt subsidy for solar plants of at least 50 kilowatts. Early this year, Beijing also announced six “golden sunlight” projects to turn the country’s capital into a solar city. Technological advances and economy of scale have reduced the cost of silicon wafers used in solar cells and promoted use of thin-film panels as an even more cost effective alternative to silicon wafers.
The government has set a 20 gigawatts solar power output target for 2020. It remains to be observed whether solar power can be extended for use at the national level due to power grid infrastructure challenges. Since most solar power plants are in remote provinces, substantial infrastructure and grid investments have to be made to bring the power for use to the rest of China. Nevertheless, with these new developments, solar will certainly play a more significant role in providing energy and development for at least the rural parts of China.
Image: World's largest color LED display powered by solar energy in Beijing
Source: China Daily
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia