Under the Radar 07.30.10
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia
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A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia
By Ian Easton and Tiffany Ma
Naval tensions mounting over recent months in the Asia-Pacific have unfolded in a blue water drama featuring almost every seafaring nation in the region.
First, a South Korean patrol ship was attacked in the Yellow Sea on March 26, an event that triggered international concern and stoked diplomatic tensions. An international inquiry concluded that there was sufficient evidence that a North Korean torpedo sank the Cheonan, and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton confirmed that there was “overwhelming and condemning” evidence of North Korean responsibility. However, China prevailed in a U.N. resolution that “condemned” the sinking of a South Korean warship without mentioning North Korea by name - a move Pyongyang hailed as a diplomatic victory.
Soon after the Cheonan incident, Tokyo found itself facing aggressive Chinese naval maneuvers in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Repeated incursions by Chinese warships in April, May, and July as well as the recent live fire drills in the East China Sea that shut down a large zone off the coast of Zhejiang province to all vessel traffic has raised concern in Tokyo and around the region. While many speculated that these live fire exercises were a possible test bed for the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile system (first acknowledged by U.S. officials in March to being in the testing phase), it appears that the more likely explanation for China’s recent maritime saber-rattling stems from its fierce opposition to the large scale U.S.-South Korean maritime exercise, code-named “Invincible Spirit.”
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| A Chinese map of Northeast Asia |
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| The USS George Washington |
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| Secretary Clinton at the ARF |
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia

The deaths of over one dozen young Kashmiri citizens in recent weeks mark a departure from a period of relative calm in the volatile region. The region is no stranger to civilian casualties. Cycles of violence and protest, exacerbated by jihadist militancy, have plagued the disputed Kashmir Valley for years. Civilians have often been caught in the clashes between security forces and militants sympathetic to Pakistan.
In the recent unrest, however, civilian deaths (including that of a 17 year-old student) occurred during attempts at crowd control by police and Indian Paramilitary Forces. In response to the public backlash, the Indian Army was deployed to the summer capital, Srinagar, for the first time in over ten years, to maintain order.
In the aftermath of these Kashmiri deaths, anger and hostility towards India has, unsurprisingly, spiked amongst the Muslim majority population that appeared to be turning against militants in previous years. These developments seem to provide a prime opportunity for Pakistan-backed militants to capitalize on anti-India sentiment and advance their struggle. Groups operating in Kashmir, such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba and even Al-Qaeda, may take advantage of public anger to incite even more violence, expand their operations in Kashmir, and scale up recruitment. This would further strain the already fragile relationship between India and Pakistan and make the prospect of peace even more unlikely.
Although Indian forces claim they only fire upon protesters in self defense, many have criticized the Paramilitary Forces for not being adequately trained to react to stone-wielding youths who, along with innocent bystanders, were reportedly met with tear gas and bullets. The lack of preparation for civil unrest may have broader implications as the Indian military and government’s response to the uprising has further stoked public outrage and disillusionment. To ameliorate the current situation, Indian forces must learn from past mistakes and focus on building relationships with the people and gaining their trust.
Going forward, India appears to be doing what it can to quell the volatile situation in Kashmir. The government has increased transparency of its actions by holding an inquiry into the killings. Although it was not attended by all Jammu and Kashmir political parties (the opposition People’s Democratic Party boycotted the meeting), the effort is representative of India’s commitment to maintaining peace in Kashmir. The parties’ call for both "internal and external dialogue" is especially symbolic considering Pakistan continues to support militants in Kashmir. In the long term, India needs to internalize the rhetoric presented during the inquiry. It must conduct meaningful dialogue that produces answers and solutions of how to avoid further clashes between civilians and Indian security forces as to not concede leverage to the militants.
Image Source: The Globe and Mail
Indonesia has received much credit for significant inroads in eradicating terrorism after the 2002 Bali bombings that left 202 people dead. Since then, Jakarta’s elite counter-terrorism police unit, Detachment 88, has netted or killed over 400 militants, while several former ‘deradicalized’ terrorists have actually cooperated with the authorities to capture their former comrades. Though several attacks on Western targets have occurred since then, none have been nearly as deadly as Bali.
Yet, Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts have come under fire in recent months. Detachment 88’s startlingly high kill-to-capture ratio (one suspect killed for every four arrested) and conduct during recent operations have raised human rights concerns, despite claims by Indonesian authorities that they are exercising proper restraint. Indonesia’s much vaunted ‘deradicalization program’ has also been criticized for producing repeat offenders. A whopping 14 of those arrested or killed in recent police operations connected with the Jakarta hotel bombings in 2009 and a terrorist cell discovered in Aceh earlier this year had been previously detained or imprisoned. Meanwhile, the twin ills of corruption and weak intelligence-gathering continue to plague Jakarta’s counter-terrorism efforts.
The government recognizes the shortcomings of its approach, and plans to launch a National Board on Antiterrorism later this year to better coordinate efforts. Yet, few are optimistic that it will solve the underlying structural deficiencies in the country’s counter-terrorism efforts. Analysts comment that entrenched problems like corruption and inter-agency rivalries will likely “continue to persist” despite this cosmetic change.
Despite this, there are several concrete ways through which Jakarta can overcome some of these challenges. Internal reviews and officer training should be conducted in order to increase the likelihood that militants can be captured alive in the future, so they can provide the intelligence necessary to weed out terrorist networks. Existing detention laws must be enforced and corruption must be stemmed so that inmates cannot engage in radicalization via technology or prison study groups. Furthermore, if the National Board is to be effective, the government must empower it in a transparent fashion by allocating an operational budget, involving the National Commission for Human Rights and other NGOs, and allowing auditing by several agencies for corruption.
Efforts to revise the current anti-terrorism law to facilitate counter-terrorism must also be done in a way that respects basic human rights. Indonesia’s top counter-terrorism chief Ansyaad Mbai ruffled feathers last year when he lamented that terrorists flocked to Jakarta because the country’s laws were not as substantial as its neighbors like Malaysia, which permit extended detention without trial. Yet adopting such an approach risks undermining the democratic traditions of the Indonesian state, which is exactly what the terrorists aspire to in the first place.
Picture: Sulekha.com
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia
In the aftermath of the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, tensions are reigniting between North and South Korea. Amid the freezing of cross-parallel ties, one of the few remnants of past cooperation, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), remains a major power piece for both the North and South.
The complex began as a joint-economic development project in 2004. Under the arrangement, North Korean industrial labors produce a variety of manufactured items, such as textiles, automotive parts and semiconductors, under the auspices of South Korean corporations. Despite Pyongyang’s political blustering on closing the border, South Korean administrative staff continue to cross the DMZ for work each morning: a sign of the complex’s importance and endurance.
For North Korea, the KIC is one of the few breadwinners in a flailing economy hobbled by underdeveloped primary and secondary sectors. For a nation with an annual export capacity of approximately USD$1.8 billion, the KIC’s potential to generate over USD$9.5 billion from 2004-2013 will constitute a significant portion of North Korea’s fiscal future. Amidst a failing economy, aging infrastructure and an oppressive authoritarian regime, North Korea’s development rests with the liberalization of their economy; a feat symbolized by the Kaesong complex.
Considering the South Korean standpoint, the KIC is essentially a tool for outsourcing production without the usual drawbacks. For the South Korean companies, the common downsides of outsourcing – language and geographical distance - are not factors at the Kaesong complex. The workforce at the KIC speaks Korean, thus eliminating the language barrier, and the site is but an hour north of Seoul, just shy of the northern border of the DMZ, therefore facilitating physical access to means of production. Labor is also much less expensive in North Korea, where the average industrial worker only earns approximately USD$65 a month, as compared to the average USD$170 per month in China.
The shared value of the KIC for both the ROK and DPRK may shield the complex from the cross-parallel fallout. In the past, many have considered the complex a permanent venture; independent from the tribulations of inter-Korean relations. Proponents commonly point to the 2006 North Korean underground nuclear test; an act that incurred multiple sanctions, but not the closure of the complex. Although Kaesong’s future is far from assured, both states have a critical and symbolic stake in the complex that sets it apart from other political cards. The KIC is crucial litmus test for inter-Korean relations in days to come. Despite rapid deterioration in relations since the Cheonan incident, preservation of economic activity at the Kaesong complex signals that this incident does not necessarily sound the knell for the relations on the peninsula.
Image source: Korea Times

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A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia

The nuclear renaissance in Asia promises to reduce the region’s dependence on fossil fuels and to reduce carbon emissions from its growing economies. However, the growth of nuclear power raises the challenge of safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste. Along with the environmental threat posed by radioactive waste, there is also proliferation concerns associated with enriched uranium and plutonium by-products that could be used to construct a nuclear or radiological weapon. Japan has chosen to reprocess its nuclear waste. Reprocessing allows for recycling of nuclear fuel, reducing Japanese demand for foreign imports of nuclear material. Reprocessing is expensive, however, and the large quantity of plutonium that remains could pose proliferation risks. While strong international safeguards reduce these risks in Japan, a wider adoption of reprocessing would increase proliferation hazards in the region.
In South Korea, domestic opposition and the high population density of the country have prevented the construction of a long-term storage site for spent fuel and other highly radioactive nuclear wastes. Although a decade of political wrangling led to the construction of a storage facility in Gyeongju for low and intermediate nuclear waste, there is no permanent facility in South Korea for highly radioactive waste. The failure to find a permanent waste disposal site coupled with plans for expanding nuclear power means that the production of nuclear waste will outstrip the capacity of the countries’ storage facilities.
Developing states in Asia including Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia are embracing nuclear power in order to meet the energy needs of their growing economies. Yet, as Malaysia demonstrates, nuclear power also brings challenges that the region is currently unprepared for. Although Malaysia plans to build a nuclear power plant by 2021 it lacks a firm plan for handling waste. While storing waste in converted tin mines has been proposed, similar facilities in France have experienced groundwater contamination. Malaysia also has a poor proliferation record and has been linked to the transfer of nuclear equipment to Iran and Libya. While the country has taken steps to improve the proliferation environment the risk of proliferation of poorly guarded nuclear materials to third parties remains far from ameliorated.
Nuclear power is a great opportunity for Asian states but also carries significant risks. A regional approach to nuclear waste management would provide an opportunity to deepen regional cooperation on energy issues and address the environment and proliferation threat posed by nuclear materials. In addition to cooperating on technical and security issues, nuclear states in the region could cooperate on the construction of waste disposal facilities to prevent both environmental damage and the diversion of nuclear materials to potentially hostile third parties.
A weekly compilation of underreported developments in Asia